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Volume 13 Issue 10
Oct.  2026

IEEE/CAA Journal of Automatica Sinica

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Article Navigation >  IEEE/CAA Journal of Automatica Sinica  > 2026  >  13(10): 2193-2209
M. Meng, X. Li, Y. Hong, and J. Chen, “A survey on optimal coalition structures among autonomous agents,” IEEE/CAA J. Autom. Sinica, vol. 13, no. 10, pp. 2193–2209, Oct. 2026. doi: 10.1109/JAS.2026.125921
Citation: M. Meng, X. Li, Y. Hong, and J. Chen, “A survey on optimal coalition structures among autonomous agents,” IEEE/CAA J. Autom. Sinica, vol. 13, no. 10, pp. 2193–2209, Oct. 2026. doi: 10.1109/JAS.2026.125921
shu

A Survey on Optimal Coalition Structures Among Autonomous Agents

doi: 10.1109/JAS.2026.125921
Funds:  This work was supported by the National Science and Technology Major Project (2022ZD0119702) and the National Natural Science Foundation of China (62473293, 62473292)
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    Abstract
  • Autonomous agents designed to achieve multiple goals or tasks can work more effectively by forming coalitions than working individually. Generating coalition structures involves two significant and challenging issues: 1) which coalitions to form and 2) how to allocate the value of a coalition among its members. Such issues are often referred to as the coalition structure generation problem within coalitional games, which is widely encountered across various fields. This paper aims to provide a survey on optimal coalition structures through the lens of three scenarios: the grand coalition, multiple coalitions and graph-restricted coalitions, covering basic concepts and methodologies. Additionally, this paper delves into summarizing and discussing recent popular algorithms/methods for seeking optimal coalition structures and value allocation schemes, along with their challenges and limitations, to invoke possible future directions.

     

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