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Jan.  2014

IEEE/CAA Journal of Automatica Sinica

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Article Navigation >  IEEE/CAA Journal of Automatica Sinica  > 2014  >  1(1): 10-18
Daizhan Cheng, Tingting Xu, Fenghua He and Hongsheng Qi, "On Dynamics and Nash Equilibriums of Networked Games," IEEE/CAA J. of Autom. Sinica, vol. 1, no. 1, pp. 10-18, 2014.
Citation: Daizhan Cheng, Tingting Xu, Fenghua He and Hongsheng Qi, "On Dynamics and Nash Equilibriums of Networked Games," IEEE/CAA J. of Autom. Sinica, vol. 1, no. 1, pp. 10-18, 2014.
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On Dynamics and Nash Equilibriums of Networked Games

  • 1. Institute of Systems Science, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing 100190, China;

  • 2. Institute of Sstronautics, Harbin Institute of Technology, Harbin 150080, China;

  • 3. Institute of Systems Science, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing 100190, China

Funds:

This work was supported by National Natural Science Foundation of China (61074114, 61273013, 61104065, 61333001).

    Abstract
  • Networked noncooperative games are investigated, where each player (or agent) plays with all other players in its neighborhood. Assume the evolution is based on the fact that each player uses its neighbors' current information to decide its next strategy. By using sub-neighborhood, the dynamics of the evolution is obtained. Then a method for calculating Nash equilibriums from mixed strategies of multi-players is proposed. The relationship between local Nash equilibriums based on individual neighborhoods and global Nash equilibriums of overall network is revealed. Then a technique is proposed to construct Nash equilibriums of an evolutionary game from its one step static Nash equilibriums. The basic tool of this approach is the semi-tensor product of matrices, which converts strategies into logical matrices and payoffs into pseudo-Boolean functions, then networked evolutionary games become discrete time dynamic systems.

     

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